Disentangling distributional motives

Benoît Chalvignac and Herrade Igersheim

Working Papers of BETA from Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg

Abstract: In this paper we present the result of a distribution experiment where players must choose between a maximin, equity-dominant solution and a Hicks optimal, efficiency-dominant distribution. Three different information conditions are used. Under the certainty condition, inequity aversion has no observable effect on the choices of the players whose payoffs vary across distributions. The risk and the uncertainty conditions yield more contrasted outcomes.

Keywords: Distribution games; Inequity aversion; Hicks efficiency; Maximin. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D03 D6 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2013-21

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