Becoming “We” Instead of “I”, Identity Management and Incentives in the Workplace

Jocelyn Donze () and Trude Gunnes

Working Papers of BETA from Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg

Abstract: In this article, we propose to view the firm as a locus of socialization in which employees with heterogeneous work attitudes can be motivated and coordinated through adherence to a social ideal of effort. We develop an agency model in which employees have both a personal and a social ideal of effort. The firm does not observe the personal ideals, but can make its workforce more sensitive to the social ideal by fostering interaction in the workplace. We show that there are two reasons why the firm invests in social bonding. First, it reinforces the effectiveness of monetary incentives. Second, strengthening the social ideal reduces the adverse selection problem and the need to devise distorted payment schemes. We also show that the firm allocates more time to social interaction when personal ideals of effort are low or heterogeneous.

Keywords: agency theory; social interaction; social norms; norm regulation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D2 D8 J3 M5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-hrm and nep-soc
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http://beta.u-strasbg.fr/WP/2015/2015-09.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Becoming “We” instead of “I”, identity management and incentives in the workplace (2018)
Working Paper: Becoming "We" Instead of "I", Identity Management and Incentives in the Workplace (2013)
Working Paper: Becoming "We" instead of "I". Identity management and incentives in the workplace (2013)
Working Paper: Becoming “We” Instead of “I”, Identity Management and Incentives in the Workplace (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2015-09

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