Other-Regarding Preferences and Giving Decision in Risky Environments: Experimental Evidence

Mickael Beaud, Mathieu Lefebvre and Julie Rosaz

Working Papers of BETA from Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg

Abstract: This paper investigates if and how other-regarding preferences governing giving decisions in dictator games are affected in risky environments in which the payoff of the recipient is random. We demonstrate that, whenever the risk is actuarially neutral, the donation of dictators with a purely ex post view of fairness should, in general, be affected by the riskyness of the recipient’s payoff, while dictators with a purely ex ante view should not be. Our experimental data give weak empirical support to the purely ex post view of fairness.

Keywords: Laboratory experiments dictator games; background risk; otherregarding preferences; inequality aversion; impure altruism; ex ante and ex post views of fairness. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D64 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-upt
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http://beta.u-strasbg.fr/WP/2018/2018-36.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Other-regarding preferences and giving decision in a risky environment: experimental evidence (2023)
Working Paper: Other-Regarding Preferences and Giving Decision in a Risky Environment: Experimental Evidence (2023)
Working Paper: Other-Regarding Preferences and Giving Decision in Risky Environments: Experimental Evidence (2018)
Working Paper: Other-Regarding Preferences and Giving Decision in Risky Environments: Experimental Evidence (2018)
Working Paper: Other-Regarding Preferences and Giving Decision in Risky Environments: Experimental Evidence (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2018-36

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