Approval voting and Shapley ranking

Pierre Dehez () and Victor Ginsburgh

Working Papers of BETA from Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg

Abstract: Approval voting allows electors to list any number of candidates and their scores are obtained by summing the votes cast in their favor. Equal-and-even cumulative voting instead follows the One-person-one-vote principle by endowing electors with a single vote that they may evenly distribute among several candidates. It corresponds to satisfaction approval voting introduced by Brams and Kilgour (2014) as an extension of approval voting to a multiwinner election. It also corresponds to the concept of Shapley ranking introduced by Ginsburgh and Zang (2012) as the Shapley value of a cooperative game with transferable utility. In the present paper, we provide an axiomatic foundation of Shapley ranking and analyze the properties of the resulting social welfare function.

Keywords: approval voting; equal-and-even cumulative voting; ranking game; Shapley value. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cdm, nep-des, nep-gth, nep-ore, nep-pol and nep-upt
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http://beta.u-strasbg.fr/WP/2019/2019-17.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Approval voting and Shapley ranking (2020)
Working Paper: Approval voting and Shapley ranking (2019)
Working Paper: Approval voting and Shapley ranking (2018)
Working Paper: Approval Voting and Shapley Ranking (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2019-17

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