Retaking Control of Local Public Services A Step-by-Step Strategy

Alexandre Mayol and Stephane Saussier ()

Working Papers of BETA from Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg

Abstract: In this paper, we studied the influence of contract renewals on water prices in France. When studying French water contracts in force between 2008 and 2018, we found that contract renewals have little influence on the prices paid by consumers. However, at contract renewal times, the share of the price that goes to the firms decreases. This price decrease is compensated by an increase in the share of the price that is retained by the municipalities. We interpret this result as a willingness by municipalities to retake control of water services. We show that the higher the municipalities’ shares are, the higher the probability of switching to direct public management at contract renewal times. This suggests a step-by-step strategy, with local authorities first increasing their responsibilities in providing water services (i.e., increasing their price shares) before switching to direct public management.

Keywords: Public-private partnerships; contract renewals; private management; water prices. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H11 L33 L95 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-eur
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2020-43

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