The role of mandatory and voluntary joint bidding in promoting efficiency in conservation auction

Jens Abildtrup, Géraldine Bocquého, Kene Boun My, Anne Stenger and Tuyen Tiet

Working Papers of BETA from Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg

Abstract: We conduct a lab experiment to investigate the impact of voluntary and mandatory joint-bidding schemes on the performance of conservation auctions. Our results suggest that joint bidding increases auction performance compared to the singlebidding baseline. Within the voluntary joint-bidding conditions, a bonus payment incentive improves auction performance by encouraging the subjects to give low bids. However, voluntary joint bidding performs worse than mandatory joint bidding, even with the bonus incentive. Therefore, when implementing voluntary joint bids to ensure high acceptability from landowners compared to mandatory ones, policymakers should carefully consider performance issues.

Keywords: Auction; Conservation; Mandatory; Joint bidding; Voluntary (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C57 C90 D70 Q50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-des, nep-env and nep-exp
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2025-40

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