Desperate vs. Deadbeat: Can We Quantify the Effect of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005?
Christian Weller (),
Amanda Logan and
Bernard Morzuch
Working Papers from Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts at Amherst
Abstract:
For decades, personal bankruptcies increased in the U.S., either reflecting growing economic distress of families or a declining stigma associated with filing for bankruptcy. In a nod to the latter argument, the U.S. Congress passed the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Prevention Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), after bankruptcies had grown to record high rates. The assumption was that with the new law many if not most bankruptcies would eventually disappear since they supposedly were the result of a “bankruptcy of convenience”. The U.S. bankruptcy rate fell indeed sharply after the law went into effect, but increased quickly again afterwards. By the end of 2007, the U.S. bankruptcy rate exceeded all levels recorded during the 1980s, and approached the levels prevalent during the early 1990s. But it remains unclear how much of these changes resulted from BAPCPA and what was attributable to other factors. In this Working Paper, the authors establish a benchmark level of the U.S. bankruptcy rates after 2005 that likely would have been observed if the law had not changed. They then compare the actual U.S. bankruptcy rate to the benchmark for 2007 to provide a sense of the effectiveness of BAPCPA.
Date: 2008
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://per.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/working_papers ... rs_151-200/WP185.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 500 Can't connect to per.umass.edu:443 (No such host is known. )
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uma:periwp:wp185
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts at Amherst Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Judy Fogg ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).