Stable Schedule Matchings

Vilmos Komornik (komornik@math.u-strasbg.fr), Zsolt Komornik (z.komornik@gmail.com) and Christelle Viauroux
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Vilmos Komornik: Université de Strasbourg
Zsolt Komornik: Université de Strasbourg

No 10-120, UMBC Economics Department Working Papers from UMBC Department of Economics

Abstract: In order to treat a natural schedule matching problem related with worker-firm matchings, we generalize some theorems of Baiou--Balinski and Alkan--Gale by applying a fixed point method of Fleiner.

Keywords: Stable matching, Schedule matching, Two-sided market; Revealed preference (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D49 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2010-05-12, Revised 2011-07-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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