Modeling the University Decision Process: The Effects of Faculty Participation in University Decision Making

Kathleen Carroll (), Lisa Dickson and Jane Ruseski

No 11-129, UMBC Economics Department Working Papers from UMBC Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper develops models of decision making in a university setting with and without faculty participation. The models predict values for the level of services or programs offered and the quality of those services in a university setting for either private nonprofit or public universities. These predictions indicate conditions under which outcomes are similar or differ with faculty participation in the decision process. The model predicts that without shared governance that universities may overinvest in non-academic quality (e.g. athletics, recreational activities). This would be exacerbated in for-profit forms of higher education. Notably, nonprofit and/or public institutions are not inefficient relative to for-profit institutions, which questions the rationale for subsidies to for-profit institutions. If academic quality provides positive externalities as has been suggested in the literature, then shared governance may be socially preferred to university decision making without faculty involvement.

Keywords: higher education; faculty governance; university decision making; incentives; nonprofit organization; public organization; organizational behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38 pages
Date: 2011-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu, nep-lab and nep-sog
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.umbc.edu/economics/wpapers/wp_11_129.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:umb:econwp:11129

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in UMBC Economics Department Working Papers from UMBC Department of Economics UMBC Department of Economics 1000 Hilltop Circle Baltimore MD 21250, USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christelle Viauroux ().