Peer-to-Peer Networks: A Mechanism Design Approach

Oksana Loginova (), X. Wang () and Haibin Lu
Additional contact information
Oksana Loginova: Department of Economics, University of Missouri, https://economics.missouri.edu/people/loginova

No 608, Working Papers from Department of Economics, University of Missouri

Abstract: In this paper we use mechanism design approach to find the optimal file-sharing mechanism in a peer-to-peer network. This mechanism improves upon existing incentive schemes. In particular, we show that peer-approved scheme is never optimal and service-quality scheme is optimal only under certain circumstances. Moreover, we find that the optimal mechanism can be implemented by a mixture of peer-approved and service-quality schemes.

Keywords: peer-to-peer networks; mechanism design. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-12-22, Revised 2006-06-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ict, nep-mic, nep-mkt, nep-net and nep-soc
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Published in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics under the title “Incentive Schemes in Peer-to-Peer Networks” 2009

Downloads: (external link)
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Kg2Bm8SZlHm14kdoH ... D9f/view?usp=sharing (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:umc:wpaper:0608

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Department of Economics, University of Missouri Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chao Gu ().