Do State Campaign Finance Reforms Reduce Public Corruption?

Jeffrey Milyo and Adriana Cordis

No 1301, Working Papers from Department of Economics, University of Missouri

Abstract: The Supreme Court has long held that campaign finance regulations are permissible for the purpose of preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption. Yet the implied hypothesis that campaign finance reforms are effective tools for combating public corruption has gone essentially untested. We conduct the first systematic evaluation of the effects of campaign finance laws on actual corruption rates in the states. We examine the effects of state reforms on both convictions and filings in public corruption cases over the last 25 years; overall, we find no strong or convincing evidence that state campaign finance reforms reduce public corruption. Earlier research that employs similar methods also finds little support for the contention that state campaign finance regulations increase public trust and confidence in government. Together, these results call into question the legal rationale for campaign finance regulations.

Keywords: public corruption; campaign finance; regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 H70 K40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 48 pgs.
Date: 2013-01-17
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe, nep-pol, nep-reg and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:umc:wpaper:1301

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