Applied Signaling: Graduate School Admissions and Frequency of STEM Majors

Ronald Harstad and Jordan Pandolfo

No 1305, Working Papers from Department of Economics, University of Missouri

Abstract: We offer a closer look at screening by graduate admissions committees in their selection of student applicants, and at applicants' strategic behavior given screening methods. Essentially, a signaling game takes place between student applicants seeking to signal ability and admissions committees seeking to inferability from proffered applications. In equilibrium, students' decisions to adopt a STEM or a non-STEM major reflect both their desire to imply high ability and the importance that admissions committees place on GPA. We find that, relative to GPA, admissions committees placing a higher weight on graduate entrance-exam scores leads to a higher fraction of students selecting STEM majors. Illustrations of the impact on the equilibrium fraction of STEM majors of grade inflation, and of alternative undergraduate grading systems, are also provided.

Keywords: graduate admissions; signaling games; inferring ability; STEM major choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 I2 J24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pgs.
Date: 2013-03-25
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu
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