Economic Incentives and Social Preferences: A preference-Based Lucas Critique of Public Policy

Samuel Bowles () and Sandra Polanía Reyes ()
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Samuel Bowles: Santa Fe Institute, University of Siena, and University of Massachusetts Amherst
Sandra Polanía Reyes: University of Siena

UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers from University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics

Abstract: Policies and explicit incentives designed for self-regarding individuals sometimes are less effective or even counterproductive when they diminish altruism, ethical norms and other social preferences. Evidence from 51 experimental studies indicates that this crowding out effect is pervasive, and that crowding in also occurs. A model in which self-regarding and social preferences may be either substitutes or complements is developed and evidence for the mechanisms underlying this non-additivity feature of preferences is provided. The result is a preference-based analogue to the Lucas Critique restricting feasible implementation to allocations that are supportable given the effect of incentives on preferences. JEL Categories: D64, H41, D78, Z13, C90

Keywords: Public goods; behavioral experiments; social preferences; second best; motivational crowding; explicit incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-pbe
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

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