Influence networks and public goods

Dunia Lopez-Pintado ()
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Dunia Lopez-Pintado: Universidad Pablo de Olavide and CORE, Universite catholique de Louvain.

UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers from University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics

Abstract: We consider a model of local public goods in a random network context. The influence network determines (exogenously) who observes whom every period and comprises a wide array of options depending on the degree distribution and the in/out-degree correlations. We show that there exists a unique equilibrium level of public good provision and compare it with the efficient level. We derive further insights for this problem by performing a comparative statics analysis.

Keywords: influence networks; public goods; out-degree; in-degree; best-shot game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D85 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-10-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic, nep-net and nep-ure
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