Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies

Michele Lombardi and Naoki Yoshihara ()

UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers from University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics

Abstract: We study Nash implementation by natural price-quantity mechanisms in pure exchange economies when agents have intrinsic preferences for responsibility. An agent has an intrinsic preference for responsibility if she cares about truth-telling that is in line with the goal of the mechanism designer besides her material well-being. A semi-responsible agent is an agent who, given what her opponents do, acts in an irresponsible manner when a responsible behavior poses obstacles to her material well-being. The class of efficient allocation rules that are Nash implementable is identified provided that there is at least one agent who is semi-responsible. The Walrasian rule is shown to belong to that class.

Keywords: Nash equilibrium; exchange economies; intrinsic preferences for responsibility; boundary problem; price-quantity mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies (2017)
Working Paper: Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies (2017)
Working Paper: Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies (2016)
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