Treading a fine line: (Im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals
Michele Lombardi and
Naoki Yoshihara ()
UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers from University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics
Abstract:
This paper investigates the robustness of Dutta and Sen (2012) Theorem 1 to weaker notions of truth-telling. An individual honesty standard is modeled as a subgroup of the society, including the individual herself, for which she feels truth-telling concerns. An individual i is honest when she states her true preferences as well as rankings (not necessarily complete) of outcomes that are consistent with the true preferences of individuals in her honesty standard. The paper offers a necessary condition for Nash implementation, called partial-honesty monotonicity, and shows that in an independent domain of preferences that condition is equivalent to Maskin monotonicity.
Keywords: Nash implementation; partial-honesty; non-connected honesty standards, independent domain (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)
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Related works:
Journal Article: Treading a fine line: (Im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals (2018) 
Working Paper: Treading a fine line: (Im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals (2017) 
Working Paper: Treading a Fine Line: (Im)possibilities for Nash Implementation with Partially-honest Individuals (2016) 
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