Public Goods in Endogenous Networks

Markus Kinateder and Luca Merlino

No 02/15, Faculty Working Papers from School of Economics and Business Administration, University of Navarra

Abstract: In this paper we study a local public good game in an endogenous network with heterogeneous agents. We consider two specifications, in which different networks arise. When agents differ in the cost of acquiring the public good, active agents form hierarchical complete multipartite graphs; yet, better types need not have more neighbors. When agents have heterogeneous benefits from the public good, nested split graphs in which investment need not be monotonic in type emerge. In large societies, few agents are active and the network dampens inequality.

Keywords: public goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D00 D85 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42 pages
Date: 2015-10-21
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-net
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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http://www.unav.edu/documents/29056/7650469/UNAV_0215.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Public Goods in Endogenous Networks (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:una:unccee:wp0215

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