An axiomatic characterization of the Owen-Shapley spatial

Hans Peters and J.M. Zarzuelo

No 15, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE)

Abstract: We present an axiomatic characterization of the Owen-Shapley spatial power index for the case where issues are elements of two-dimensional space. This characterization employs a version of the transfer condition, which enables us to unravel a spatial game into spatial games connected to unanimity games. The other axioms are spatial versions of anonymity and dummy, and two conditions concerned particularly with the spatial positions of the players. We show that these axioms are logically independent.

Date: 2015-01-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:umagsb:2015015

DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2015015

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