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Best response cycles in perfect information games

P. Jean-Jacques Herings and Arkadi Predtetchinski

No 17, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE)

Abstract: We consider n-player perfect information games with payofffunctions having a finite image. We do not make any further assumptions, so in particular we refrain from making assumptions on the cardinality or the topology of the set of actions and assumptions like continuity or measurability of payofffunctions. We show that there exists a best response cycle of length four, that is, a sequence (σ0, σ1, σ2, σ3, σ0) of pure strategy profiles where every successive element is a best response to the previous one. This result implies the existence of point-rationalizable strategy profiles. When payoffs are only required to be bounded, we show the existence of an ϵ-best response cycle of length four for every ϵ > 0.

Date: 2015-01-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-hpe
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Journal Article: Best-Response Cycles in Perfect Information Games (2017) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:umagsb:2015017

DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2015017

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