Doing it now, later, or never

K. Cingiz, J. Flesch, P. Jean-Jacques Herings and Arkadi Predtetchinski
Additional contact information
K. Cingiz: Microeconomics & Public Economics
J. Flesch: Quantitative Economics

No 22, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE)

Abstract: We study centipede games played by an infinite sequence of players. Following the literature on time-inconsistent preferences, we distinguish two types of decision makers, naive and sophisticated, and the corresponding solution concepts, naïve ϵ-equilibrium and sophisticated ϵ-equilibrium. We show the existence of both naive and sophisticated ϵ-equilibria for each positive ϵ. Under the assumption that the payoff functions are upper semicontinuous, we furthermore show that there exist both naive and sophisticated 0-equilibria in pure strategies. We also compare the probability to stop of a naive versus a sophisticated decision maker and show that a sophisticated decision maker stops earlier.

Date: 2015-01-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/8743 ... 37931df-ASSET1.0.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Doing it now, later, or never (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:umagsb:2015022

DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2015022

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Andrea Willems () and Leonne Portz ().