Deposit insurance in times of crises: safe haven or regulatory arbitrage?

Stefanie Kleimeier, S. Qi and Harald Sander
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S. Qi: Finance

No 26, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE)

Abstract: This paper examines the impact of deposit insurance (DI) schemes on bilateral cross-border deposits. Our results suggest that not only the existence of explicit DI, but also DI design features, which reflect its credibility have an impact on cross-border deposits, and that the relative differences between reporting and depositor countries also matter. More importantly, in times of crises, depositors rely more on DI in general, but DI acts primarily as a "Safe Haven" rather than enabling "Regulatory Arbitrage". During the global financial crisis of 2008/09 the emergency actions of bank country governments, which supply and maintain these safe havens, have led to substantial relocations of cross-border deposits.

Date: 2015-01-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba and nep-ias
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:umagsb:2015026

DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2015026

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