Feasible sets, comparative risk aversion, and comparative uncertainty aversion in bargaining

Bram Driesen (), Michele Lombardi and Hans Peters

No 31, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE)

Abstract: We study feasible sets of the bargaining problem under two different assumptions: the players are subjective expected utility maximizers or the players are Choquet expected utility maximizers. For the latter case, we consider the effects on bargaining solutions when players become more risk averse and when they become more uncertainty averse.

Date: 2015-01-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-upt
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Journal Article: Feasible sets, comparative risk aversion, and comparative uncertainty aversion in bargaining (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:umagsb:2015031

DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2015031

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