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Reward and punishment in a team contest

F.A. Heine and M. Strobel
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F.A. Heine: Microeconomics & Public Economics
M. Strobel: Microeconomics & Public Economics

No 34, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE)

Abstract: A team contest entails both public good situations within the teams as well as a contest across teams. In an experimental study, we analyse behaviour in such a team contest when allowing to punish or to reward other group members. Moreover, we compare two types of contest environment: One in which two groups compete for a prize and another one in which we switch off the between-group element of the team contest. Unlike what experimental studies in isolated public goods games indicate, we find that reward giving, as opposed to punishing, induces higher contributions to the group project. Furthermore, comparing treatment groups, expenditures on rewarding other co-players are significantly higher than those for punishing. This is particularly pronounced for the between-group contest.

Date: 2015-01-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-ppm
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Reward and punishment in a team contest (2020) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:umagsb:2015034

DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2015034

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