A paradox of rationality à la von Neumann-Morgenstern

M.S. Ismail
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M.S. Ismail: Microeconomics & Public Economics

No 41, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE)

Abstract: We show that there are games and decision situations in which it is not possible for the decision maker to be rational a la von Neumann-Morgenstern in both situations simultaneously, which is the source of the paradox presented in this note. We provide an assumption which is the necessary and sufficient condition for a decision maker to be rational in both situations.

Date: 2015-01-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe, nep-mic and nep-upt
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:umagsb:2015041

DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2015041

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