Feasible elimination procedures in social choice: an axiomatic characterization

Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters

No 1, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE)

Abstract: Feasible elimination procedures (Peleg, 1978) play a central role in constructing social choice functions which have the following property: in the associated game form, for any preference profile there exists a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in the sincere outcome. In this paper we provide an axiomatic characterization of the social choice correspondence resulting from applying feasible elimination procedures. The axioms are anonymity, Maskin monotonicity, and independent blocking.

Date: 2016-01-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/5456 ... fd211db-ASSET1.0.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Feasible elimination procedures in social choice: An axiomatic characterization (2017)
Working Paper: Feasible elimination procedures in social choice: an axiomatic characterization (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:umagsb:2016001

DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2016001

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Andrea Willems () and Leonne Portz ().