Frequency Based Analysis of Voting Rules

Swarnendu Chatterjee and Ton Storcken
Additional contact information
Swarnendu Chatterjee: QE Math. Economics & Game Theory, RS: GSBE ETBC
Ton Storcken: QE Math. Economics & Game Theory, RS: GSBE ETBC

No 6, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE)

Abstract: In a large electorate it is natural to consider voters’ preference profiles as frequency distributions over the set of all possible preferences. We assume coherence in voters’ preferences resulting in accumulation of voters preferences. We show that such distributions can be studied via superpositions of simpler so called unimodal distributions. At these, it is shown that all well-known rules choose the mode as the outcome. We provide a set of sufficient conditions for a rule to have this trait of choosing the mode under unimodal distributions. Further we show that Condorcet consistent rules, Borda rule, plurality rule are robust under tail-perturbations of unimodal distributions.

JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-03-23
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/11608715/RM17006.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:umagsb:2017006

DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2017006

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Andrea Willems () and Leonne Portz ().