EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Matching with Myopic and Farsighted Players

P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch

No 11, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE)

Abstract: We study stable sets for marriage problems under the assumption that players can be both myopic and farsighted. We introduce the new notion of the myopic-farsighted stable set, which is based on the notion of a myopic-farsighted improving path. A myopic-farsighted stable set is the set of matchings such that there is no myopic-farsighted improving path from any matching in the set to another matching in the set (internal stability) and there is a myopic-farsighted improving path from any matching outside the set to some matching in the set (external stability). For the special cases where all players are myopic and where all players are farsighted, our concept predicts the set of matchings in the core. When all men are myopic and the top choice of each man is a farsighted woman, we show that the singleton consisting of the woman-optimal stable matching is a myopic-farsighted stable set. The same result holds when all women are farsighted. We present examples where this is the unique myopic-farsighted stable set as well as examples of myopic-farsighted stable sets consisting of a core element different from the woman-optimal matching or even of a non-core element.

JEL-codes: C70 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-05-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/12333728/RM17011.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Matching with myopic and farsighted players (2020) Downloads
Working Paper: Matching with myopic and farsighted players (2020)
Working Paper: Matching with Myopic and Farsighted Players (2017) Downloads
Working Paper: Matching with myopic and farsighted players (2017) Downloads
Working Paper: Matching with Myopic and Farsighted Players (2017) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:umagsb:2017011

DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2017011

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Andrea Willems () and Leonne Portz ().

 
Page updated 2025-04-01
Handle: RePEc:unm:umagsb:2017011