Condorcet versus participation criterion in social welfare rules

Burak Can, Emre Ergin and Mohsen Pourpouneh
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Emre Ergin: General Economics 0 (Onderwijs), RS: GSBE ETBC

No 20, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE)

Abstract: Moulin (1988) shows that there exists no social choice rule, that satisfies the following two criteria at the same time: the Condorcet criterion and the participation criterion, a.k.a., No Show Paradox. We extend these criteria to social welfare rules, i.e., rules that choose rankings for each preference profile. We show that the impossibility does not hold, and one particular rule, the Kemeny rule satisfies both the Condorcet and the participation criteria.

JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-09-14
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-mic and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:umagsb:2017020

DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2017020

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