On-the-job-training as a signal: Why low-educated workers invest less in further training
Olga Meshcheriakova and
Stan Vermeulen
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Olga Meshcheriakova: Macro, International & Labour Economics, RS: GSBE DUHR
Stan Vermeulen: Macro, International & Labour Economics, RS: GSBE DUHR
No 21, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE)
Abstract:
Studies of on-the-job training have found that low skilled workers participate less in further training. In this paper, we develop a signalling model of training where training can increase productivity when workers’ prior ability matches the level of the training course. Consequently, employers can use observed training participation as information about the quality of their employees when job performance is unobservable. As a result, programs aimed at low ability workers will be underutilized because of the negative signal participation conveys about their initial ability. We show that offering training has spillover effects: introducing high-level courses to a choice set of only low-level courses increases participation in low-level courses, and improves sorting efficiency. We discuss the implications of these results for optimal training provision, and make several testable predictions for assessing the validity of our model.
JEL-codes: J24 J45 M53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-09-26
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hrm
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:umagsb:2017021
DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2017021
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