Information aggregation with continuum of types

Irem Bozbay and Hans Peters

No 32, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE)

Abstract: We consider an information aggregation problem where a group of voters wants to make a `yes' or `no' decision over a single issue. Voters have state-dependent common preferences, but hold possibly conflicting private information about the state in the form of types (signals). We assume that types are distributed from a state-dependent continuous distribution. In this model, Bayesian equilibrium voting and efficient voting coincide, and informative voting means that a voter votes in favor of the issue if and only if the signal exceeds a cut-point level. Our main result is an answer, in the form of a condition on the parameters of the model, to the question when informative voting is efficient.

JEL-codes: C70 D70 D71 D80 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-12-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-ict and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Journal Article: Information aggregation with a continuum of types (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:umagsb:2017032

DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2017032

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