Bertrand Competition with Asymmetric Costs: A Solution in Pure Strategies

Thomas Demuynck, P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Riccardo Saulle () and Christian Seel

No 2, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE)

Abstract: We consider two versions of a Bertrand duopoly with asymmetric costs and homogeneous goods. They differ in whether predatory pricing is allowed. For each version, we derive the Myopic Stable Set in pure strategies as introduced by Demuynck, Herings, Saulle, and Seel (2017). We contrast our prediction to the prediction of Nash Equilibrium in mixed strategies.

JEL-codes: C70 C72 D43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-02-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth, nep-ind, nep-mic and nep-ore
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Related works:
Journal Article: Bertrand competition with asymmetric costs: a solution in pure strategies (2019)
Working Paper: Bertrand competition with asymmetric costs: a solution in pure strategies (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:umagsb:2018002

DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2018002

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