Multi-Battle n-Player Dynamic Contests

Nejat Anbarci (), Kutay Cingiz and Mehmet Ismail
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Kutay Cingiz: General Economics 0 (Onderwijs), RS: GSBE ETBC

No 3, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE)

Abstract: In presidential primaries, proportional campaign resource allocation to states with respect to their delegate numbers is a desirable concept. To study proportionality, we introduce a novel model for n-player multi-battle dynamic contests. We show that when players maximize their expected number of delegates there is a subgame perfect equilibrium in which players allocate their resources proportionally. However for at least 4 number of states and at least 2 delegates, when players maximize their probability of winning, there is always a distribution of delegates over the states such that population proportionality is not satisfied.

JEL-codes: C73 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-02-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:umagsb:2018003

DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2018003

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