Farsighted Rationality

Dominik Karos and Laura Kasper
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Dominik Karos: RS: GSBE ETBC, Microeconomics & Public Economics, RS: GSBE Theme Conflict & Cooperation

No 11, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE)

Abstract: Farsighted deviations are based on agents' abilities to compare the outcome of a farsighted deviation to the status quo. However, agents do not account for deviations by others in case they do not change the status quo; so, they are not fully farsighted. We use extended expectation functions to capture a coalition's belief about subsequent moves of other coalitions in both cases. We provide three stability and optimality axioms on coalition behavior and show that an expectation function satisfies these axioms if and only if it corresponds to an equilibrium of the abstract game that is stable with respect to coalitional deviations. We provide applications of our solution for games in characteristic function form and matching problems.

JEL-codes: C71 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-04-26
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:umagsb:2018011

DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2018011

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