Restricted domains with Pareto free pairs

Ton Storcken
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Ton Storcken: RS: FSE DKE Mathematics Centre Maastricht, RS: GSBE Theme Conflict & Cooperation, QE Math. Economics & Game Theory

No 12, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE)

Abstract: Among the domains restricted by Pareto free pairs we determine those allowing for preference rules being anonymous and independent of irrelevant alternatives. Essentially such preference rules appear to be based on a priority ordered at which adjacent alternatives can only be swapped in order is all agents agree with this swap.

JEL-codes: D71 D79 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-09-16
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-isf, nep-mic and nep-ore
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:umagsb:2021012

DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2021012

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