Democratizing intellectual property systems: how corruption hinders equal opportunities for firms

Caroline Paunov

No 2014-077, MERIT Working Papers from United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT)

Abstract: This paper analyses how corruption affects firms ownership of intellectual property titles that relate to firms technological, organizational and further innovation efforts quality certificates and patents. Using firm-level data covering 48 developing and emerging countries, we show corruption reduced the likelihood of firms seeking quality certificates. Smaller firms were more affected by corruption and benefited less from higher levels of trust in their business environment. Corruption did not have impacts on the quality certificate ownership of exporters, foreign- and publicly-owned firms. Firms machinery investments were also negatively affected. By contrast, we do not find effects on firms ownership of patents.

Keywords: Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights; Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development; Intellectual Property Rights (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 O12 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ino, nep-ipr, nep-pr~, nep-knm, nep-law and nep-sbm
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:unumer:2014077

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