Politicians and their promises in an uncertain world: Evidence from a lab-in-the-field experiment in India

Prasenjit Banerjee, Vegard Iversen, Sandip Mitra, Antonio Nicolo' and Kunal Sen

No wp-2019-60, WIDER Working Paper Series from World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER)

Abstract: In emerging economies, pro-social policy outcomes may be prevented by bureaucratic inefficiency, capture by elected or non-elected office holders, or by other hurdles. For local citizens, uncertainty about the true cause of such failures often prevails. We study the pro-sociality of politicians' decision-making in a modified dictator game with real politician participants in rural India. In our game, a recipient citizen does not know whether dictator politician capture or bad luck is to blame when receiving zero.

Keywords: Asymmetric information; Lab-in-field experiment; Politician (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
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Working Paper: Politicians and Their Promises in an Uncertain World: Evidence from a Lab-in-the-Field Experiment in India (2018)
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