Clientelistic politics and pro-poor targeting: Rules versus discretionary budgets

Dilip Mookherjee and Anusha Nath

No wp-2021-125, WIDER Working Paper Series from World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER)

Abstract: Past research has provided evidence of clientelistic politics in delivery of programme benefits by local governments, or gram panchayats (GPs), and manipulation of GP programme budgets by legislators and elected officials at upper tiers in West Bengal, India. Using household panel survey data spanning 1998-2008, we examine the consequences of clientelism for distributive equity. We find that targeting of anti-poverty programmes was progressive both within and across GPs and is explained by greater 'vote responsiveness' of poor households to receipt of welfare benefits.

Keywords: Clientelism; Governance; Targeting; Budget (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev, nep-isf and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/Publ ... o-poor-targeting.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Clientelistic politics and pro-poor targeting: Rules versus discretionary budgets (2023)
Working Paper: Clientelistic Politics and Pro-Poor Targeting: Rules versus Discretionary Budgets (2021)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unu:wpaper:wp-2021-125

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in WIDER Working Paper Series from World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Siméon Rapin ().