Social ties, clientelism, and the poor's expectations of future service provision: Receiving more, expecting less?

Prisca Jöst and Ellen Lust

No wp-2021-138, WIDER Working Paper Series from World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER)

Abstract: Are candidates who hand out clientelistic goods at election time less likely to provide services once they take office? This paper examines the poor's expectations of future service provision by candidates who hand out money and other goods versus those who do not. We hypothesize that the poor's expectations should depend on the density of social ties. To test this hypothesis, we use hierarchical models to analyse observational data and two conjoint experiments embedded in a unique survey of Kenyans, Malawians, and Zambians.

Keywords: vote-buying; Clientelism; Social cohesion; Poverty; Service delivery (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-isf, nep-soc and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/Publ ... ervice-provision.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unu:wpaper:wp-2021-138

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in WIDER Working Paper Series from World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Siméon Rapin ().