Voter coercion and pro-poor redistribution in rural Mexico

Dragan Filipovich, Miguel Niño-Zarazúa and Alma Santillán Hernández

No wp-2021-141, WIDER Working Paper Series from World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER)

Abstract: Voter coercion is a recurrent threat to pro-poor redistribution in young democracies. In this study we focus on Mexico's paradigmatic Progresa-Oportunidades-Prospera (POP) programme. We investigate whether local mayors exploited POP to coerce voters, and if so, what effect these actions had on the municipal incumbent's vote.

Keywords: Voting; Clientelism; Conditional cash transfers; Rural poverty; Mexico (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-dev, nep-isf and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unu:wpaper:wp-2021-141

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