Contract clientelism: How infrastructure contracts fund vote-buying

Alisha Holland and Will Freeman

No wp-2021-155, WIDER Working Paper Series from World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER)

Abstract: Where does the money come from to buy votes? We argue that an important source of funds for vote-buying comes from 'contract clientelism', or the provision of public contracts to private firms in exchange for campaign donations. Using quantitative data on Colombian infrastructure contracts, we demonstrate that municipalities exhibit an 'electoral contracting cycle' in which incumbents assign low-quality contracts while on the campaign trail. Contract manipulations are more common in municipalities with higher reports of clientelist activity.

Keywords: Contracts; vote-buying; Clientelism; Infrastructure; Colombia; Public goods; Firms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-dev and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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