Forms and methods of combating the illegal use of insider information and intentional market manipulation in modern Russia

Alexandr Susyev ()
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Alexandr Susyev: Department of Economics, Lomonosov Moscow State University

No 20, Working Papers from Moscow State University, Faculty of Economics

Abstract: The urgency of this problem is caused by particularly acute hazards associated with the misuse of insider information and market manipulation. Disclosure of information not intended for a wide range of people or the use of illicit trading technologies, when some competitors enjoy significant advantages over others, seriously threatens the normal functioning of the domestic financial market. The paper notes that in addition to direct financial loss - compensations, fines and costs aimed to eliminate the impact of unauthorized disclosure of valuable internal (insider) information regarding various nuances of activities and deliberate manipulation of the market - the company (companies) experience huge consequential damages. This results in drawing away clients, increasing competition, losing business reputation. In conclusion, the article discusses in detail the institutional forms and methods of combating these negative phenomena, used in Russia and other developed countries.

Keywords: insider information; insider trading; market manipulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 E44 G12 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
Date: 2015-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cis and nep-tra
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:upa:wpaper:0020

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