A foundation for strategic agenda voting

Jose Apesteguia, Miguel Ballester and Yusufcan Masatlioglu

Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Abstract: We offer complete characterizations of the equilibrium outcomes of two prominent agenda voting institutions that are widely used in the democratic world: the amendment, also known as the Anglo-American procedure, and the successive, or equivalently the Euro-Latin procedure. Our axiomatic approach provides a proper understanding of these voting institutions, and allows comparisons between them, and with other voting procedures.

Keywords: Strategic Voting; Agendas; Committees; Institutions; Axioms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D02 D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Working Paper: A Foundation for Strategic Agenda Voting (2015)
Journal Article: A foundation for strategic agenda voting (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:upf:upfgen:1302

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