Choice by sequential procedures

Jose Apesteguia and Miguel Ballester

Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Abstract: We propose a rule of decision-making, the sequential procedure guided by routes, and show that three influential boundedly rational choice models can be equivalently understood as special cases of this rule. In addition, the sequential procedure guided by routes is instrumental in showing that the three models are intimately related. We show that choice with a status-quo bias is a refinement of rationalizability by game trees, which, in turn, is also a refinement of sequential rationalizability. Thus, we provide a sharp taxonomy of these choice models, and show that they all can be understood as choice by sequential procedures.

Keywords: Individual rationality; Bounded rationality; Behavioral economics. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D01 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-dcm, nep-evo, nep-mic and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Choice By Sequential Procedures (2015)
Journal Article: Choice by sequential procedures (2013)
Working Paper: Choice by Sequential Procedures (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:upf:upfgen:1309

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