On strategic transmission of gradually arriving information

Alexander Frug

Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Abstract: The main insight of the literature on strategic information transmission is that even a small conflict of interest between a fully informed sender (e.g., a financial adviser) and an uninformed receiver (an investor) often poses considerable difficulties for effective communication. However, in many real-life situations, the sender is not fully informed at the outset but gradually studies the case before offering advice. The gradual arrival of information to the sender weakens the strategic barriers between the players and significantly improves communication.

JEL-codes: D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-ore
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Related works:
Working Paper: On Strategic Transmission of Gradually Arriving Information (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:upf:upfgen:1691

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