Social security in theory and practice (I): Facts and political theories
Casey Mulligan and
Xavier Sala-i-Martin
Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra
Abstract:
166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forces create and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? We document some of the internationally and historically common features of Social Security programs including explicit and implicit taxes on labor supply, pay-as-you-go features, intergenerational redistribution, benefits which are increasing functions of lifetime earnings and not means-tested. We partition theories of Social Security into three groups: "political", "efficiency" and "narrative" theories. We explore three political theories in this paper: the majority rational voting model (with its two versions: "the elderly as the leaders of a winning coalition with the poor" and the "once and for all election" model), the "time-intensive model of political competition" and the "taxpayer protection model". Each of the explanations is compared with the international and historical facts. A companion paper explores the "efficiency" and "narrative" theories, and derives implications of all the theories for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan.
Keywords: Social Security; retirement; gerontocracy; retirement incentives; political theories of Social Security (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-lab, nep-mic, nep-pol and nep-pub
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (46)
Downloads: (external link)
https://econ-papers.upf.edu/papers/384.pdf Whole Paper (application/pdf)
Related works:
Working Paper: Social Security in Theory and Practice (I): Facts and Political Theories (1999) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:upf:upfgen:384
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).