Stochastic evolution of rules for playing normal form games

Fabrizio Germano

Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Abstract: The evolution of boundedly rational rules for playing normal form games is studied within stationary environments of stochastically changing games. Rules are viewed as algorithms prescribing strategies for the different normal form games that arise. It is shown that many of the folk results of evolutionary game theory typically obtained with a fixed game and fixed strategies carry over to the present case. The results are also related to recent experiments on rules and games.

Keywords: Rules; evolutionary dynamics; stochastic dynamics; bounded rationality; learning; normal form games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D81 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo and nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:upf:upfgen:761

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