Do Rent Increases Reduce the Housing Supply Under Rent Control? Evidence from Evictions in San Francisco

Brian Asquith

No 19-296, Upjohn Working Papers from W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research

Abstract: Rent control balances strong tenant protections with supply-side incentives for landlords. However, cities with rent control are also some of the United States' most unaffordable, prompting questions about how well these incentives are working. I examine how controlled landlords change their housing supply in response to price increases using a well-identified hyperlocal demand shock the privately operated commuter shuttle systems in San Francisco. Controlled landlords increased market withdrawal filings and became less likely to create vacancies via evictions in response to a shuttle stop placement. Policies raising barriers to market withdrawals prompted controlled landlords to respond my increasing their at-fault evictions.

Keywords: rent control; evictions; private transportation; LASSO (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K11 R31 R32 R52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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