Does Employment Protection Legislation Affect Firm Investment? The European Case
Giorgio Calcagnini and
Germana Giombini
No 902, Working Papers from University of Urbino Carlo Bo, Department of Economics, Society & Politics - Scientific Committee - L. Stefanini & G. Travaglini
Abstract:
This paper aims at analyzing the impact of Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) on frms' investment policies in the presence of financial imperfections. Our results show that investment is positively correlated to measures of internal funds available to firms and negatively to the level of national labour market regulation. Moreover, the latter is stronger wherever financial market imperfections are larger: firms with better access to financial markets are in a position to determine their optimal investment policy, even in the presence of stringent Employment Protection Laws, than those facing financial constraints. Our results support the effort put forward by European institutions in recent years to reform both markets.
Keywords: Employment Protection Legislation; Financial Constraints; Investments. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C23 D92 J30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2009, Revised 2009
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-eec and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.econ.uniurb.it/RePEc/urb/wpaper/WP_09_02.pdf First version, 2008 (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Does employment protection legislation affect firm investment? The European case (2014) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:urb:wpaper:09_02
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from University of Urbino Carlo Bo, Department of Economics, Society & Politics - Scientific Committee - L. Stefanini & G. Travaglini Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Carmela Nicoletti ().