Credit Expansion and Banking Crises: The Role of Guarantees

Giorgio Calcagnini and Germana Giombini

No 903, Working Papers from University of Urbino Carlo Bo, Department of Economics, Society & Politics - Scientific Committee - L. Stefanini & G. Travaglini

Abstract: This paper aims at analysing whether banking changes that occurred in Italy in the last fifteen years have mined the soundness of its financial system. We look for potential threats to financial stability as a result of the dynamic behaviour of Italian banks that progressively have been favouring consumer households at the expense of firms in the allocation of credit. The theme of financial instability is closely linked to the question of capital regulation, which is a centrepiece of government intervention because it affects banks? soundness and risk taking incentives. After reviewing the literature on capital regulation, we first discuss the role of guarantees as a solution to banks? potential instability in the case of credit default and, secondly, we estimate a bank interest rate model that explicitly includes collateral and personal guarantees as explanatory variables. We show that banks follow different lending policies according to the type of customer. In the case of firms banks seem to efficiently screen and monitor customers and guarantees (real and personal) are both used to reduce moral hazard problems. In the case of consumer households and sole proprietorships banks behave ?lazily? by replacing screening and monitoring activities with personal guarantees; instead, collateral is used to separate good from bad customers (i.e., to mitigate adverse selection problems). These results, together with the large proportion of bad loans in case of unsecured loans, may indicate the existence of potential sources of financial instability because (a) personal guarantees are a small share of loans, especially in the case of consumer households, (b) a decline in the value of collateral held by banks in the event of a housing market weakening.

Keywords: Banking Crisis; Household and Firm Credit Growth; Banking Regulation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E44 G21 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2009, Revised 2009
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-mac, nep-reg and nep-ure
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http://www.econ.uniurb.it/RePEc/urb/wpaper/WP_09_03.pdf First version, 2008 (application/pdf)

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