Welfare Enhancing Coordination in Consumer Cooperatives under Mixed Oligopoly

Marco Marini, Paolo Polidori, Alberto Zevi and Désirée Teobaldelli

No 1303, Working Papers from University of Urbino Carlo Bo, Department of Economics, Society & Politics - Scientific Committee - L. Stefanini & G. Travaglini

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to study the welfare e?ects of consumer cooperatives in mixed oligopoly markets. We show that under decreasing returns to scale and su? ciently high market competition these ?rms can contribute more to social welfare when acting on behalf of all consumers rather than only one representative consumer. This is because, by coordinating the preferences of consumers, these ?rms reduce their excessive market output, helping the market to come closer to the ?rst-best. In all other cases we show that such consumers coordination is not required to improve welfare.

Keywords: Consumer-owned Firms; Mixed Oligopoly; Collusion; Welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C71 D23 D43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
Date: 2013, Revised 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-mic, nep-mkt and nep-net
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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http://www.econ.uniurb.it/RePEc/urb/wpaper/WP_13_03.pdf First version, 2013 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: WELFARE ENHANCING COORDINATION IN CONSUMER COOPERATIVES UNDER MIXED OLIGOPOLY (2015)
Working Paper: Welfare enhancing coordination in consumer cooperatives under mixed oligopoly (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:urb:wpaper:13_03

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